Within the prevailing literature, there is little agreement as to the exact definition, attributes or interventions of the ‘developmental state’. Yet, chapter thirteen of South Africa’s National Development Plan (NDP) asserts that “neither social nor economic transformation is possible without a capable and developmental state,” thereby entrenching this nebulous concept as a crucial aspect of our country’s growth strategy.[1]

It is not clear how much exploration South African policy-makers have undertaken to determine what a ‘developmental state’ should look like within the unique context of our country, and the vague nature of the concept makes it difficult to come to a consensus around its meaning. The NDP itself alludes to different types of developmental states – the chapters relating to economic growth present a conventional or neo-liberal perspective, while those that talk to welfare seem starkly socialist.

Hence, there is a need to better understand what is generally meant by a ‘developmental state’’, and to assess whether this concept can be used or adapted as an appropriate growth model for South Africa. The South East Asian experience may provide some clues, but the context is very different. Fortunately, several African nations have started to unpack the value of a “developmental state” for themselves, and the lessons from these countries deserve serious consideration.

What is a ‘developmental state?’

Key Attributes and Mechanisms of a ‘developmental state’

Despite the lack of consensus around its exact definition, there are certain attributes and mechanisms that repeatedly feature in the relevant literature and which provide a clearer picture of what a ‘developmental state’ looks like in practice. These ‘key attributes’ refer to typical characteristics and features often displayed by developmental states, whereas the ‘mechanisms’ are tools that have frequently been used by such states in their attempts to generate economic growth.

However, there is no minimum number of attributes a state must display or tools it must have used to be classed as ‘developmental,’ and different countries have in fact exhibited a variety of attribute/mechanism mixes in pursuing their unique growth paths. Furthermore, it is not always possible nor desirable for developmental states to use multiple mechanisms at once, as they do not always complement one another. Indeed, the implementation of certain policies exclude the adoption of others – for example, a tight fiscal policy may preclude the use of overly generous foreign investment incentives.

Table One: Key Attributes of a Developmental State

Table Two: Key Mechanisms of a Developmental State

The concept of a ‘developmental state’ in Africa

As already mentioned – chapter thirteen of the South African National Development Plan has inserted the concept of a ‘developmental and capable state’ into the country’s growth strategy. The Plan clearly envisions a very active and interventionist role for government in driving growth and development in South Africa. However, despite the significant political, social and economic changes implemented by Government since the dawn of democracy, South Africa has been unable to achieve and sustain the rate of economic growth achieved by the Asian ‘Tigers.’ This raises questions about the ability of South Africa to adapt and implement the growth and development strategies of the East.

Fortunately, a handful of other African countries have also adopted the ‘developmental state’ framework and it is worthwhile examining their experiences to draw insights for South Africa’s situation. The three other African countries that have identified in the literature as being associated with the concept of a ‘developmental state’ are Rwanda, Botswana and Ghana.

Rwanda [8]

Rwanda’s developmental trajectory was kick-started by the notoriously devastating genocide of 1994, in which approximately 800 000 people were killed. The tragedy saw the Rwandan state adopt an authoritarian, ‘good enough governance’ approach to growth in which the political and economic elite rule by dictatorship, yet strive to maintain their legitimacy through the promotion of economic development and improved standards of living for all citizens.

The ultimate aim is to rebuild Rwanda into a unified and stable country attractive to foreign investors and tourists. The government has relied heavily upon industrial policy to promote economic growth in the manufacturing and agricultural sectors. The state has also been proactive in investing into the creation of a social protection net for its citizens, which has led to expanded investments in education, public works programmes and the creation of a national health insurance. It has also focused on fostering social cohesion to unite the nation after the genocide, through both regulation and community campaigns or projects.

Rwanda’s execution of its development plan is assisted by the fact that it has in place a Weberian bureaucracy, staffed by skilled and motivated public servants. State owned enterprises and parastatals – such as the Rwanda Development Board – play an integral role as government implementation entities. There is, in addition, a visible military presence throughout the country to impose compliance and maintain peace.

Botswana [9] 

Part of the secret to Botswana’s development success is that it was able to harness the strong bureaucracy that it inherited from the British, to direct the national economy. It was also proactive and innovative in incorporating traditional leadership elements into modern governing structures, which assisted in generating public support for the government’s programmes.

In addition to focusing on strengthening its education, healthcare and infrastructure sectors, the manner in which Botswana managed its natural resources (diamond reserves) is particularly noteworthy. The government was able to negotiate mutually beneficial agreements with international diamond companies to ensure that a large proportion of the country’s mineral rents accrued to the Government.

Ghana [10]

Since its independence in 1957, Ghana’s developmental journey has largely revolved around administrative reforms, most of which have unfortunately not been successful. Each ruling regime has attempted to make reforms of their own, which included numerous attempts to strengthen government implementation capacity. However, corruption, nepotism and a lack of political support undermined the effectiveness of the significant resources dedicated to restructuring the bureaucracy. Thus, despite a long history of developmental planning, the country has never been able to effectively execute its policies and growth strategies.

Common threads across African developmental states

Based on the experience of these three countries, it appears that the concept of a ‘developmental’ state can be successfully applied within an African context. In some instances, this was because the key developmental attributes and mechanisms were already in place, whereas in other cases, the state expended effort into creating the necessary pre-conditions. In both Rwanda and Botswana, for example, strong Weberian bureaucracies were capable of not only setting the correct path and policies for development, but also executing these strategies. Where Rwanda lacked social unity and citizen support for the government, it now has initiated numerous initiatives to generate the necessary buy-in.

On the other hand, many African states are emerging from conflict, have heterogeneous populations, low levels of skilled labour and weak governing structures. In such countries, a concept such as the developmental state is not likely to be easily adopted, without a significant commitment from the ruling elite to create the required pre-conditions. The Ghanaian experience highlights how the developmental agenda can be hijacked by unfavourable political conditions.

Can South Africa be a ‘developmental state?’

Taking into account the key attributes and mechanisms outlined above, South Africa might appear to have many of the necessary pre-conditions for an effective developmental state. A clear vision for growth and development is outlined in the National Development Plan; numerous implementing and planning agencies are in place; its policies are very much focused on promoting redistribution and social protection; and the democratically elected ruling party has historically enjoyed a large and united support base. During the first decade of South Africa’s democracy, the country closely resembled and conducted itself as a developmental state.

However, despite this initial impetus, it would seem that the country has moved away from the construct of a developmental state over the last decade. This has become most clear in recent months, with large parts of the government and the ruling party demonstrating that they are not immune from external interference and vested political interests. Moreover, the state’s autonomy is limited by South Africa’s openness to the world economy, and the country’s vulnerability to global commodity markets and international financial flows.[11]

South Africa’s developmental state aspirations are also hampered by the deep racial and economic divides that the country is still battling to overcome, not to mention the very high levels of inequality that separate the few ‘haves’ from the ‘have not’ population.[12] In other words, South African society is far from united. Furthermore, whereas pockets of excellence and skilled, competent staff exist in many Government departments, on the whole, the bureaucracy lacks internal coherence and is known for its service delivery backlogs.[13]

So where does this leave South Africa?

South Africa’s plans and polices are certainly ‘developmental’, but overall, the country has been unable to execute them fully and effectively, and the current Government appears to lack implementation capacity. The country’s intention of becoming a developmental state is clearly outlined in the NDP however, in practice, commitment to this ideal has wavered between political cycles. Moreover, the State does not have the authoritarian strength of the Rwandan government nor the respected leadership of Botswana’s Weberian bureaucracy.

It is for these reasons that von Holdt argues that South Africa is less like the East Asian developmental states and more like the ‘intermediate states’ of Brazil and India. These countries lie somewhere “between developmental and predatory states, and have less coherent or effective bureaucracies as well as less productive relationships with society than do developmental states.”[14]

If South Africa is to truly bring the NDP to life, it needs to focus on building state capacity, prioritising strategic policy areas and minimising political interference and corruption. As a first step in this direction, policy-makers may need to seriously consider chapter thirteen of the NDP (which specifically focuses on “building a professional public service and a capable state”, and prioritise those interventions which are most likely to contribute towards a stronger, stable, cleaner, coherent and more skilled and efficient government. Without these basic principles in place, it will be impossible to transfer the concept of the South African developmental state from grand plans to actual practice.